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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC. 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and, 
RICHARD ANDREWS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 91-0384 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HON. FRANK G. NOEL, JUDGE PRESIDING 
(Trial Court Case No. C-91-090-2847) 
THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
CHRIS ALLEN and RICHARD ANDREWS, by and through their 
counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard and John Pace of the 
Utah Legal Clinic, submit the following Brief in support of 
Plaintiffs' appeal. 
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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
Appellants (the "Society") bring this appeal from a 
decision by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Hon* Frank Noel, judge presiding. 
The Third Judicial District Court granted the appellee's 
(the "Attorney General's") motion to dismiss. Appellants 
seek the reversal of this decision and an opportunity for a 
hearing on the merits. 
This Court has jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 4A of the Utah Rules of Appellate-
Procedure and Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Issues 
1. Were any facts presented to the trial court to 
establish that plaintiffs' complaint was moot? 
2. Did the trial court rule correctly in denying this 
matter judicial review either for the purpose of providing 
future guidance to the Attorney General and other public 
officials or for the purpose of interpreting the Utah 
Constitution? 
3. Is the Society entitled to injunctive and 
declaratory relief as to the unconstitutionality of the 
Attorney General's past and anticipated financing of a pro-
prayer stance in the Rhode Island case, Lee v. Weisman, No. 
90-1014 pending before the United States Supreme Court? 
II. Standard of Review 
Because the trial court's ruling on these issues is 
strictly a legal conclusion, this court need accord it no 
deference and should apply a "correction of error" standard 
of review. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988) . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are 
determinative in this action: 
Article I, § 4, Utah Constitution: 
The right of conscience shall never be infringed. 
. . . There shall be no union of Church and 
State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or 
property shall be appropriated for or applied to 
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or 
for the support of any ecclesiastical establish-
ment. 
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion . . . 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
The Society challenges the constitutionality of the 
Attorney General's filing of an amicus brief urging review 
in Weisman v. Lee1 by the United States Supreme Court. In 
addition, this challenge is based on the Attorney General's 
public promise to submit another brief on the merits in the 
Rhode Island school prayer case. Appellants seek injunctive 
and declaratory relief to establish the unconstitutionality 
of this activity. 
This action arises under Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution which prohibits the appropriation of public 
funds to further religious exercise. By submitting his 
legal argument in the Rhode Island case, the Attorney 
General unconstitutionally funded the promotion of religious 
exercise and ecclesiastic establishment at public expense. 
Because important issues of constitutional inter-
pretation and the propriety of a public official's conduct 
are raised by this matter, it deserves judicial attention 
despite its possible mootness. The Attorney General's 
1
 The cases below were Weisman v. Lee, 728 F.Supp. 68 
(D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir.). 
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public statement that he will commit further public funds 
toward legal involvement in the Rhode Island school prayer 
case underscores the need for judicial direction and 
instruction in this case, 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Hon, Frank 
Noel of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint (Exhibit "a" attached; 
Trial Record, pp. 3-8) as set forth in the court's Minute 
Entry of July 9, 1991 (Exhibit "b" attached; Trial Record, 
pp. 31-3 3) and later embodied in an Order of Dismissal 
signed July 30, 1991. Exhibit "c" attached; Trial Record, 
pp. 88-89. The notice of appeal was dated August 5, 1991 
and was timely filed. Exhibit "d" attached; Trial Record, 
pp. 92-93. 
Judge Noel dismissed this action believing that the 
case was moot. The district court declined to rule on the 
constitutionality of the contested behavior, contending that 
such an opinion would provide no future guidance to the 
Attorney General should a similar situation arise. The 
court further offered dicta that the actions of the Attorney 
General in filing the first amicus brief were within the 
5 
scope of his authority. In contrast, the Appellants seek a 
ruling on the merits of the issues implicated by this case 
establishing the unconstitutionality of the Attorney 
General's past and anticipated appropriations. 
III. Statement of Facts 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In response to plaintiffs' complaint, defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss (Trial Record, pp. 12-13) and a supporting 
memorandum on May 28, 1991 (Trial Record, pp. 14-2 0) 
suggesting, inter alia, that plaintiffs' claims were moot. 
Defendant's counsel's assertions notwithstanding, defendant 
never filed any affidavit(s) to prove the facts necessary to 
establish mootness. The burden was and is upon defendant to 
prove mootnesse There were no facts before the trial court 
and there are no facts before this Court to establish that 
plaintiffs' claims are moot. 
Because the complaint was dismissed on a motion to 
dismiss, all of the facts well plead in plaintiffs' 
complaint must be deemed as true. Exhibit "a" attached. 
The source of the following statement of facts is 
largely plaintiffs' complaint. Exhibit "a" attached. 
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B. PACTS BEFORE THE COURT 
The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists, 
Inc., comprised of citizens and taxpayers of Utah including 
appellants Chris Allen and Richard Andrews, has as a 
corporate goal the preservation of the separation of church 
and state as required by state and federal constitutional 
law. Complaint, 5 1. 
On January 17, 1991, the appellee Attorney General 
filed an amicus brief with United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Lee v. Weisman supporting the Providence, Rhode 
Island school board's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
The Attorney General sought judicial review and a reversal 
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting 
public prayers at high school graduation ceremonies. 
Complaint, J 7; (a copy of the amicus brief is filed as an 
exhibit in this action, Trial Record, pp. 34-54.) 
After the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the Rhode Island case, the Attorney General publicly stated 
that his office would file another amicus brief — this time 
addressing the merits — in that case. In addition, on 
April 24, 1991, the Salt Lake Tribune carried a "letter to 
the editor" from the Attorney General promising such action. 
Exhibit "e" attached. 
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The following week, on Law Day, May 1, 1991, the 
Society filed this action, seeking a temporary restraining 
order and a permanent injunction to prevent the filing of 
that second brief on the merits and contending that the 
Attorney General's past and future promised behavior 
violated the Utah Constitution. Exhibit "a". 
Defendant's counsel claims that May 22, 1991 was the 
United States Supreme Court deadline for the filing of 
another amicus brief in support of the Rhode Island School 
Board. On May 28, 1991 the Attorney General submitted a 
motion to dismiss in this case asserting that this action 
was moot due to the passing of this alleged deadline. 
As these events were occurring, other Utah public 
officials were becoming involved in the Rhode Island case. 
The Superintendent of Utah Public Schools, Jay B. Taggart, 
contributed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) of taxpayer 
money to the Providence, Rhode Island School District to 
finance the district's lawsuit. This contribution was to 
assist Rhode Island in defending its practice of allowing 
graduation prayers. Superintendent Taggart also threatened 
to file a brief on the merits in that case. Society of 
Separationists. Inc., et al vs. Jay B. Taggart, etc., 
pending before this Court as Case No. 91-0387. In addition, 
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the Alpine School District actually filed an amicus brief in 
Lee v, Weisman on the merits which vigorously advocated 
prayer in public schools. Society of Separationists, Inc. 
et al vs. The Board of Education of Alpine School District, 
pending in Fourth District Court in and for Utah County, 
Case No. 91-040-0647. In light of this activity, the 
Society opted to pursue its claim, seeking judicial 
consideration of issues raised by the Attorney General's 
conduct. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Neither the trial court nor this Court have been 
presented with any evidence to show that plaintiffs/ 
appellants' complaint is moot. 
Although appellants' complaint might be technically 
moot, substantial precedent and argument support the 
Society's request for a hearing on the merits. The disputed 
acts of the Attorney General raise important questions 
concerning constitutional interpretation and governmental 
conduct which are worthy of judicial review. In addition, 
because it is almost impossible to contest the propriety of 
one time public expenditures before such claims become moot, 
this Court should take this opportunity to rule on an issue 
9 
that would otherwise evade judicial review. Finally, the 
unilateral claim of the Attorney General that he has temp-
orarily refrained from filing an amicus brief on the merits 
of the Rhode Island case does not diminish the need for 
judicial guidance in this matter. 
If subjected to judicial scrutiny, the actions of the 
Attorney General would prove unconstitutional. Seeking 
certiorari review in the Rhode Island case entails 
supporting the position of allowing graduation prayer and 
thus involves the unconstitutional expenditure of Utah 
public funds. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ALTHOUGH ALLEGEDLY MOOT, THIS CASE DESERVES JUDICIAL 
REVIEW.2 
This Court favors access to the courts for the 
resolution of controversies. Because the dismissal of an 
action without a hearing is a severe measure, this court has 
warned that the procedure is to be used sparingly: lf[T]he 
trial court should adhere to a policy of being reluctant to 
turn a party out of court without a trial." Wells v. Walker 
Bank and Trust Co., Inc., 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979). 
See also Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 
1990); Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 243 P.2d 411 
(Utah 1952). The case before this Court presents valid and 
important issues of constitutional interpretation and the 
appropriateness of official conduct which deserve judicial 
attention. To dismiss this action deprived both the 
appellants and the public of an opportunity for adjudication 
of their rights. 
2
 Beyond the unverified assertions of defendants 
counsel, no evidence has been submitted to show plaintiffs' 
claims are moot. Plaintiffs' complaint on its face does not 
establish mootness. 
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A, Exceptions to the mootness doctrine exist where important 
issues of wide concern and apt to be repeated affect the 
public interest. 
Although there is a strong policy against adjudication 
of moot questions, circumstances do exist which afford 
exception to this practice. See Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & 
Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982) .3 In Wickham v. 
Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981), this court announced 
criteria for determining which cases deserved continued 
judicial attention despite their apparent mootness: 
The principles that determine the justiciability 
of the instant case are the well-established rules 
which permit a court to litigate an issue which, 
although technically moot as to a particular 
litigant at the time of appeal, is of wide 
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to 
recur in a similar manner, and because of the 
brief time any one person is affected, would 
otherwise escape judicial review. 
Id. at 899 (citations omitted). See also Kelp v. 
Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah 1987); Southern Pacific 
Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 
3
 In Merhish, this Court ruled that when the only 
relief sought — a wage payment — was awarded in full, the 
respondent's motion concerning a lien and garnishment was 
moot. The Court held that Merhish was moot because the 
employee had been granted his wage payments and further 
requests for judicial relief would not affect the rights of 
the litigants. Here, however, no relief has been granted to 
appellants and a clarification of constitutional rights 
would result from judicial determination. 
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498, 515 (1911) (determining that "moot" situations "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review" should be subject to 
judicial review). While the decision to address a moot 
issue rests with the court, the choice to hear a case is 
most often made in "class actions, questions of 
constitutional interpretation, issues as to the validity or 
construction of a statute, or the propriety of 
administrative rulings." Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 
1044 (Utah 1990) (quoting McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 
1191 (Utah 1974)). Additionally, exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine are justified when "there seldom will be sufficient 
time for an appellate court to intervene before" the 
challenged conduct is concluded. Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987). 
The view that issues of particular public importance 
should be reviewed despite their apparent mootness is 
supported by several opinions from other jurisdictions. The 
New Mexico Supreme Court maintained that although recently 
passed legislation resolved the issues in the case before 
the bench, the important constitutional concern of 
separation of powers raised by Mowrer v. Rusk warranted 
judicial determination, 518 P.2d 866 (N.M. 1980). Because 
"[t]he parameters of the separation of powers doctrine 
13 
present a recurring problem of great public interest," the 
case could not be dismissed because of mootness. Mowrer, at 
890. The Court reasoned that "[a]mong the criteria 
considered in determining the existence of the requisite 
degree of public interest are . . . the desirability of an 
authoritative determination for future guidance of public 
officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the 
question." Xd. at 889 (citing People v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 
769, 772 (111. 1952) (cert, denied)). 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eight Circuit insisted that although the school district 
indicated that prayers in band class would not be continued, 
Steele v. Van Buren Public School District presented an 
actual controversy: "Voluntary cessation of allegedly 
illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to 
hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case 
moot." 845 F.2d 1492, 1494 (8th Cir. 1988)(quoting United 
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953) (where 
"the heavy burden of demonstrating that xthere is no 
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated' was 
placed on the defendant")). Because the Van Buren school 
district failed to show "that it does not and will not 
permit prayer at school functions," the case was not moot. 
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Steele at 1494-95. The challenge to the school district 
action remained valid because the defendant was free to 
resume the disputed conduct. Id. at 1494. 
B. Because this case presents critical questions of 
constitutional interpretation and qovernmental conduct which 
impact the public interest, it deserves the attention of 
this court. 
As the foregoing cases establish, the current matter 
presents constitutional issues which demand clarification by 
this Court. The actions of the Attorney General — the use 
of public funds to file an amicus curiae brief in the case 
of Lee v. Weisman, and a public promise to file another 
brief on the merits in the same case — raise questions 
significant to the public interest. In particular, the 
lengthy and detailed language of the Utah religious 
establishment clause imposes a heightened duty on state 
actors to maintain rigid separation of church and state. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 4. Indeed, few things 
warrant the attention of this Court nor threaten the public 
interest more than the possibility that state officials are 
violating a highly prized provision of the State 
Constitution. 
Application of the criteria for exceptions to the 
mootness doctrine recited in Wickham indicate that this 
15 
matter should not be dismissed without judicial review. The 
constitutional questions at issue here —> the character of 
the state establishment clause protections — in the context 
of official conduct are of broad public concern. In 
addition, the speed with which public officials can dedicate 
public funds under their discretion to the support religious 
exercise will rarely permit adequate opportunity for 
judicial intervention before an appropriation has been made 
and the funds spent. Also significant is the emphasis in 
Wickham and Mowrer that issues technically moot but prone to 
repetition should be decided on their merits. In the 
absence of direction from this Court, the challenged 
behavior of the Attorney General is likely to reoccur and 
the parameters of the separation of church and state in Utah 
are apt to remain ambiguous. As in Mowrer, a ruling on the 
constitutionality of the Attorney General's conduct would 
serve to guide not only his future actions, but those of all 
public officials entrusted with discretion over the public 
coffers. 
The principle of Steele that unilateral cessation of 
challenged behavior does not lessen the relevance of 
judicial intervention further supports the appellants' 
arguments. Although the first amicus brief has long been 
16 
filed, the Attorney General insists that he did not violate 
the State Constitution by spending public funds in support 
of a pro-prayer legal stance. Although the Attorney General 
recanted on his public pledge to file a second amicus brief 
on the merits, his promise to do so indicates that he finds 
nothing unsettling about his past behavior and that he would 
not hesitate to engage in similar behavior in the future. 
Clearly, under W.T. Grant, the Attorney General has not met 
his burden of demonstrating that he will not repeat the 
contested conduct. Despite the appellee's alleged voluntary 
and temporary termination of his disputed appropriations, he 
remains free to (and apparently prone to) engage in similar 
behavior unless there is a ruling from this Court.4 
The reasoning and direction of these cases indicates 
that appellants' request for injunctive and declaratory 
relief is worthy of a judicial attention. Appellants are 
4
 Guidance to governmental officials is especially 
necessary and important to the constitutional issues raised 
by this case; not only the Attorney General has become 
involved in spending public funds on the Rhode Island School 
prayer case. Jay Taggart, Utah State School Superintendent, 
outright gave ten thousand dollars ($10,000) of taxpayers' 
money to the Providence, Rhode Island School District to 
support their pro-prayer position in Lee v. Weisman and 
vowed to file an amicus brief in that case as well. In 
addition, on May 24, 1991, the Alpine School District in 
Utah County filed their own amicus brief in Lee v. Weisman, 
vigorously advocating prayer at public school functions. 
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entitled to a ruling on the constitutionality of the 
Attorney General's behavior especially in light of his 
failure to guarantee that similar appropriations will not be 
made. Courts are particularly compelled to make judgments 
when constitutional questions and the lawfulness of conduct 
of public officials is at issue. Most importantly, a ruling 
on the merits of this case will properly serve the important 
public interest in further delineating the separation of 
church and state demanded by Utah's establishment clause. 
II. THE SOCIETY DESERVES INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 
ON THE BASIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAST AND ANTICIPATED 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE RHODE ISLAND PRAYER CASE. 
By using public funds to compose and file an amicus 
brief urging the United States Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari in the matter of Lee v. Weisman, the Attorney 
General violated the Utah State Constitution. Article I, § 
4 of that charter provides, in part: 
The right of conscience shall never be infringed. 
. . . There shall be no union of Church and 
State, nor shall any church dominate the State of 
interfere with its functions. No public money or 
property shall be appropriated for or applied to 
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or 
for the support of any ecclesiastical establish-
ment. 
The effect of petitioning the United States Supreme Court to 
review the First Circuit decision in Weisman v. Lee was to 
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seek the overturn of that case and to establish a legal 
precedent for state sanctioned prayers at various public 
school ceremonies. In addition, the Attorney General 
further jeopardized public funds by promising to file a 
brief on the merits in that case. Thus, the Attorney 
General unlawfully utilized public funds to promote 
religious exercise breaching the wall between church and 
state erected by Utah's establishment clause. Although the 
appellee can exercise discretion in the pursuit of public 
interest, he can do so only within constitutional limits.5 
A. The Utah establishment clause is a formidable separation 
between church and state and prohibits the use of public 
funds to threaten this division. 
The Utah State Constitution provides a strict and 
specific guarantee of separation of church and state. See 
Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 689 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, 
J., concurring and dissenting, four separate opinions, 
utilizing constitutional construction which looked to the 
precise wording of the provision for the framers' intent). 
State of Utah v. Jiminez. 588 P.2d 707 (Utah 1978), 
has been cited to support the argument that the Attorney 
General is free to use his discretion in the public 
interest. While public officials are often empowered to 
perform duties which require the exercise of broad duties, 
they are never authorized to violate the Constitution. 
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Specifically, the Utah Constitution establishes the right of 
citizens not to have public funds spent on religious 
exercise, to have a government free of secular influence and 
to have a government which does not involve itself in the 
endorsement of religion. See Manning v. Sevier County. 517 
P.2d 549, 552-553 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring, 
"Section 4, Article I . . . is more articulate and express 
[than the federal constitution] in assuring religious 
liberty and prohibiting discrimination, or church 
interference with private or public rights.11). By expanding 
the protection owed its citizens beyond that provided by 
federal law, the authors of the Utah Constitution emphasized 
the importance of prohibiting conduct such as that of the 
Attorney General which smacks of state encouragement or 
endorsement of religious exercise. 
Although Utah courts have had little opportunity to 
interpret the provisions of the State Constitution relevant 
to this case, other states with similar constitutional 
provisions have afforded their citizens extensive 
protections. See Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 
809 P.2d 809, 816 (Cal. 1991) (finding "sectarian" public 
prayers unacceptable because they appeared to "place the 
government's stamp of approval on a particular type of 
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religious practice11); California Teachers Association v. 
Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981); Witters v State Commission 
for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989); Witters v. 
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 489 rehearing denied, 475 U.S. 1091 (1986); Weiss v. 
Bruno, 506 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1973) (announcing that the 
conclusive prohibitions of the Washington state charter 
precluded the use of a balancing test or a claim of ffde 
minimis" violation to avoid entanglement); Kay v. Douglas 
School District, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986). 
Both statutory interpretation and reference to the laws 
of other states indicate that Utah's religion clause 
absolutely prohibits the use of public money or aid to 
encourage, even indirectly, prayer or the institution of 
prayer. The unconditional pronouncements of Article I, § 4 
place rigid constraint upon state action. Importantly, this 
provision disallows the public underwriting of legal stance 
seeking the institutionalization and approval of prayer at 
graduation ceremonies. 
21 
B. The function of defendant's filing an amicus brief with 
the Supreme Court was to promote prayer in public schools 
and to unlaw-fully spend Utah public funds. 
By encouraging certiorari review of the Rhode Island 
case, the Attorney General was, in effect, seeking the 
overturn of the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
banning such prayer. In addition, the Attorney General's 
argument — that by filing the brief he sought only a ruling 
to aid the resolution of issues in Utah — necessarily 
fails. Because no neutral reason for filing the amicus 
brief exists, the Attorney General's action are implicated 
as pro-prayer. Finally, by promising to file a brief on the 
merits of Rhode Island case, the Attorney General further 
illustrated his willingness to spend public funds in support 
of graduation prayers.6 
The First Circuit decision in Weisman v. Lee is 
consistent with the rulings of other federal Courts of 
Appeal that prayer at public school events violates the 
6
 Interestingly, in his motion to dismiss herein the 
Attorney General claimed that the time for him to file an 
amicus brief on the merits had expired. At the time he 
filed that motion, the time had expired only if he was 
planning on filing a brief in support of the Providence, 
Rhode Island school board. If he had intended to file an 
amicus brief in support of the persons objecting to school 
prayer, the time limit had not expired. 
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federal establishment clause.7 See Collins v. Chandler 
7
 Opponents of the Lee v Weisman ruling allege that 
the conflicts exist among recent rulings in the Courts of 
Appeals. The Sixth Circuit, in Stein v. Plainwell Community 
Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987), applied a test from 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (where nonsectarian 
prayers opening state legislative sessions were upheld 
because of the traditional nature of the practice), to 
reject the use of the nonsecular prayers during graduation 
ceremonies. The First Circuit in Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. 
Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990) 
rejected the Marsh test as inapplicable to the situation of 
public schools. Instead they adopted the three-prong 
Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971) (affording particular concern for prayer in the 
particular context of public elementary and secondary 
schools). Those in favor of certiorari review want the 
Supreme Court to rule on the appropriateness of applying the 
Marsh test to public school prayer issues. 
However, three weeks after the Stein decision was 
handed down, the Supreme Court confirmed the appropriateness 
of the Lemon test in school related Establishment Clause 
cases. Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The 
Court further specified that because the Marsh test was 
founded upon a historical approach, it was "not useful in 
determining the proper roles of church and state in public 
schools, since free public education was virtually non-
existent at the time the Constitution was adopted." Id. at 
583 n.4. Thus, the Supreme Court has already decided which 
test to apply to the public school context. 
The Attorney General's emphasis upon the traditional 
use of prayer in graduation ceremonies in Utah and his 
willingness to ignore the holding in Edwards indicates a 
pro-prayer stance. In addition the brief interprets Board 
of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mercrens. 495 U.S. 
, 110 S.Ct. 2356 (1990), as suggesting that "prayer at 
a school ceremony outside the classroom context may be 
constitutionally valid", when this case actually holds that 
prayer at religious club meeting was valid under the Equal 
Access Act. This reading of the case again illustrates the 
Attorney General's bias toward overturning Lee v Weisman. 
By itself, his request for certiorari represents a pro-
prayer position. In addition, his alleged impartial brief 
employs legal reasoning and interpretation that favors an 
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Unified School District, 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Jagger v. Douglas County School District, 862 F.2d 824 (11th 
Circuit); Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools. 822 F.2d 
14 06 (6th Cir* 1987). Indeed, asking the Supreme Court to 
review the Rhode Island case was a request to overrule this 
long established policy against prayer in public school. 
Only those who desire a weakening of the establishment 
clause and more religious exercises in public schools would 
seek an opportunity for the overruling of a case which 
upheld these principles. 
Additionally, the Attorney General justified his amicus 
brief in part because he sought the end of litigation in 
Utah's courts concerning prayer at school. Of course, a 
decision by the Supreme Court to deny certiorari would 
achieve this goal more readily. Such a denial would uphold 
the First Circuit's ruling that prayer in public high school 
ceremonies violates the establishment clause. Indeed, 
because the First Circuit's ruling is consistent with 
precedent and with Utah's clear constitutional provisions, 
without further review it could stand as a solid guide to 
Utah's public school officials. Similarly, the case could 
abandonment of the Supreme Courts' long established policy 
of preventing prayer in the public school context. 
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serve as important precedent in the adjudication of any Utah 
prayer cases still pending under federal law. 
Another dilemma which the Attorney General envisioned -
- public school officials trapped between individuals 
seeking to compel prayers at schools and those wishing to 
prevent them — is totally unfounded. In Abington School 
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the argument that failure to allow 
organized prayer would either violate the free exercise 
clause or would amount to the establishment of religious 
secularism. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) 
(rejecting a state statute endorsing silent prayer because 
the purpose of the bill was to return voluntary prayer to 
the public schools). The Attorney General could not 
honestly seek remedy for this fictitious dispute by calling 
for guidance from the Supreme Court. Alternatively, Utah 
could easily avoid the issue of graduation prayer by 
establishing a neutral stance with respect to religion, 
denying prayer at public school functions. 
Most importantly, the provisions of Utah's 
constitutional establishment clause remain the final 
determinative factor as to the propriety of prayer in Utah 
public schools. See Sands v. Moronao Unified School 
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District, 809 P. 2d 809, 836 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., 
concurring) (maintaining in the context of graduation prayer 
the "[s]tate courts are, and should be, the first line of 
defense for individual liberties"). Although the present 
holdings of the various federal Courts of Appeals present a 
unified legal basis to which Utah Courts can look to, the 
Utah Constitution requires protection more expansive than 
that provided under federal law. 
The United States Supreme Court in deciding Weisman v. 
Lee will not consider the controlling provisions in Art. I, 
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution. Thus, a decision in Weisman 
v. Lee will be of little help in determining the scope and 
application of Art. I, § 4 to high school graduation prayers 
in Utah. 
Thus, the alleged goals which the Attorney General 
sought to advance by petitioning for certiorari could have 
been equally achieved without the expenditure of public 
funds and without taking a stance favoring religious 
exercises. However, he explicitly chose to argue for 
certiorari review and the eventual reversal of the 
prohibition of graduation prayers. This, added to his 
promise to file a brief on the merits in the Rhode Island 
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case, constitutes an unlawful expenditure of public funds to 
advance a religious practice. 
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CONCLUSION 
No facts have been presented to this Court or to the 
trial court to establish that plaintiffs' claims are moot. 
On its face, plaintiffs' complaint is not moot. The burden 
was and is on defendant to present facts to establish 
mootness; defendant has failed to do so. 
The constitutionality of the Attorney General's 
behavior should be determined by this court. The present 
case questions the legality of an expenditure of public 
funds in support of a legal stance to allow a public school 
system to encourage and support the practice of religion. 
Although the Attorney General has already filed a brief in 
support of petition to grant certiorari and may be prevented 
from filing further court briefs in Weisman v. Lee, the case 
should still be reviewed and considered despite any possible 
mootness. Important constitutional issues and questions of 
official mis-conduct, capable of repetition, remain to be 
addressed. 
Requesting United State Supreme Court review of the 
First Circuit ruling in Weisman v. Lee displays a clear 
interest in overturning the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. The endorsement, by the Utah Attorney General, of 
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prayer within the Providence, Rhode Island public high 
school system should be declared unconstitutional. 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and 
this matter remanded for further hearing on the merits of 
plaintiffs' claims. 
Dated this 2nd day of MARCH, 1992. 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
sosvand.scb 
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB #0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC. 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and, 
RICHARD ANDREWS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney 
General of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant . 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil NO.91-090-2847 CV 
(Hon. F. Noel 
THE PLAINTIFFS, as a cause of action against R. Paul 
Van Dam, state and allege as follows: 
1. The Society of Separationists, Inc. is a Maryland 
non-profit corporation registered to do business in Utah. 
One of the corporate goals of the Society and of the Utah 
Chapter of the corporation is to preserve and maintain the 
separation of church and state as required by the United 
States Constitution (First Amendment) and the Utah Constitu-
tion (Art. I, § 4). 
2. The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists, 
Inc. is made up of individual members who are residents and 
taxpayers of the State of Utah. 
3. Chris Allen is a resident and citizen of the State 
of Utah. He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid 
various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah. 
He is a member and the Director of the Utah Chapter of the 
Society of Separationists, Inc. 
4. Richard Andrews is a resident and citizen of the 
State of Utah. He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid 
various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah. 
He is a member and the Co-Director of the Utah Chapter of 
the Society of Separationists, Inc. 
5. R. Paul Van Dam is the duly elected and serving 
Attorney General of the State of Utah. He supervises 
assistant attorneys general working for and employed by the 
State of Utah in the Office of the Utah Attorney General. 
6. Art. I, § 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part: 
. . . The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . There shall be no 
union of Church and State, nor shall any church 
dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the 
support of any ecclesiastical establishment. 
7. The State of Utah acting by and through the defen-
dant, R. Paul Van Dam filed an amicus brief before the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of Robert E. Lee, et 
al v. Daniel Weisman, etc., Case No. 90-1014, urging that 
Court to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari. (That 
case is hereinafter referred to as the "Rhode Island School 
Prayer case.") The issue in that case is a challenge on 
federal constitutional grounds to a practice of having 
denominational prayers at high school graduation ceremonies 
in the state of Rhode Island. 
8. The United States Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in the Rhode Island School Prayer case describe 
above. 
9. The defendant R. Paul Van Dam has publically stated 
that his office on behalf of the State of Utah or an agency 
thereof will file an amicus brief in the United States 
Supreme Court in Rhode Island School Prayer case addressing 
the merits of that case. 
10. The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief 
on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the 
defendant and his staff on behalf of the State of Utah or an 
agency thereof will result in the use and expenditure of 
public money and/or property by the defendant and his staff. 
11. The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief 
on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the 
defendant and his staff on behalf of the State of Utah will 
result in the use and expenditure of public money or proper-
ty by the defendant and his staff in the aid of religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, and/or for the support of 
an ecclesiastical establishment. 
12. The use of the name of the State of Utah in filing 
of such an amicus brief on the merits in the Rhode Island 
School Prayer case by the defendant will result in the 
support of an ecclesiastical establishment. 
13. The plaintiffs object to the expenditure of public 
funds for the purpose of aiding any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, and/or for the support of an 
ecclesiastical establishment. 
14. The plaintiffs object to the use of the name of 
the State of Utah in filing of such an amicus brief on the 
merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case as improper 
support of an ecclesiastical establishment. 
15. The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and 
restrained by this Court, the defendant will expend public 
funds as set forth above in violation of Art. I# § 4 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
16. The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and 
restrained by this Court, the defendant will violate Art. I, 
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution by supporting a ecclesiastical 
establishment through the filing of an amicus brief in the 
name of the State of Utah. 
17. The anticipated actions of the defendant in 
preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits in the 
Rhode Island School Prayer case will be in violation of the 
provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
WHEREFORE, this Court should enter a temporary re-
straining order, a preliminary injunction and a permanent 
injunction against the defendant, his agents, staff and 
employees prohibiting them from expending any public funds 
or property in preparing and filing an amicus brief on the 
merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case. 
This Court should enter a temporary restraining order, 
a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction against 
the defendant, his agents, staff and employees prohibiting 
them from preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits 
in the Rhode Island School Prayer case in the name of the 
State of Utah. 
Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs incurred 
herein and such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper in the premises. 
DATED LAW DAY this 1st day of MAY, 1991-
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC. 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and 
RICHARD ANDREWS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, 
Defendant, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 910902847 CV 
Now before the Court is defendants Motion to Dismiss, 
the Court has reviewed the memos filed in connection with said 
motion and now rules as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that inasmuch as the State is 
now barred from filing any brief on the merits of the case in 
Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 pending before the Supreme Court of 
the United States, that this matter is now moot. The only 
relief requested by plaintiffs in their complaint pertains to 
injunctive relief regarding the possible filing by the Attorney 
Generals Office of a brief in the above mentioned matter. That 
possibility no longer exists. Further the Court is not 
persuaded that any opinion it might render on the merits in the 
instant case would provide any future guidance to the Attorney 
SOC. OF SEPARATIONISTS V VAN DAM PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Generals Office on cases that may arise in the United States 
Supreme Court in the future. 
While the plaintiffs have not sought any relief with 
regard to the brief already filed by the defendant at the 
petition stage of the Lee v. Weisman case, nevertheless the 
filing of that brief has been condemned by plaintiffs as an 
abuse of the defendant's authority and relied upon by plaintiffs 
as an indication that the defendant may abuse its' authority in 
a similar fashion in the future. The Court feels compelled to 
note that it is of the opinion that the defendant did not abuse 
its' authority in asking the Supreme Court to review a case in 
the hope that the Court's ruling would clear up some of the 
confusion that now exists in the law on the matter of prayer at 
school graduation ceremonies. This issue is a matter of 
national interest and significance, and is certainly of interest 
and importance to the people of the State of Utah in light of 
the litigation involving school prayer that now exists between 
citizens and entities of the State of Utah 
For the .reasons stated, and further for the reasons 
stated in defendant's memorandum the Court grants defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an 
order consistent with this ruling. 
DATED this \_ day of July, 1991. x—^ 
FRANK G. N O E L \ v 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE J 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this day of July, 1991: 
Brian M. Barnard 
John Pace 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
R« Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER #2140 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3220 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC, 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and, 
RICHARD ANDREWS , 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 910902847CV 
Judge: Frank G. Noel 
The court, having considered argument pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated May 28, 1991, under Rule 4-
501 C.J.A,, and being fully advised in the premises, and having 
made its Minute Entry dated July 9, 1991, which entry is on file 
herein, 
NOW ORDERS, that this matter be and hereby is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
Dated this ji_l' day of , 1991 
FRANK G. NOEL 
District Judge 
( 
PLAINTIFF' 
EXHIBIT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of 
A J L V - I 1991, a copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
JOHN PACE 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
-2-
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC. a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; 
and, RICHARD ANDREWS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney 
General of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 910902847 CV 
(Hon. Frank G. Noel) 
The plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby appeal 
that certain Order and Dismissal signed in the above 
captioned matter on July 30, 1991 and as embodied in the 
minute entry dated July 9, 1991. This appeal is to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
DATED this l ^ f day of AUGUST, 1991. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs—^ 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the 'ffi&i day of AUGUST, 1991, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH.LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB # 5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND.FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; etc., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney 
General of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant. 
EXHIBIT & 
: REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 
NOTICE 
: Civil No. 91-0902847 CV 
PLAINTIFFS, by and through counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD 
and JOHN PACE of the Utah Legal Clinic submit the attached 
EXHIBIT (a photocopy of a "Letter to the Editor" written by 
the defendant and published by the Salt Lake Tribune on 
Wednesday, April 24, 1991). 
Plaintiffs request that this Court take judicial notice 
of this "Letter to the Editor," its content and its publica-
tion as set forth above. 
DATED this 3rd day of JUNE, 1991. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing EXHIBIT & REQUEST to: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3 6 South State Street # 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the &// day of JUNE, 1991, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
is somehow the responsibility of the 
United States. 
Orve could make the argument that 
President Bush should have allowed 
the troops to go on to Baghdad to 
dispose of Saddam, but such an ac-
tion would have been illegal under 
the United Nations mandate and in 
all likelihood would not have 
changed the fate of the Kurds. Every 
five to 10 years the Kurds have chal-
lenged the Iraqis in Baghdad and 
have ben crushed in their attempts. 
The Kurds obviously made a con-
scious decision once again during the 
gulf war to revolt, and once again 
they have failed. 
The United States bears no re-
sponsibility for this decision or their 
present plight. In fact I feel that the 
billions of dollars being spent on 
supposed humanitarian aid would be 
far better spent on our homeless and 
poor here in the United States where 
we would be assured of proper dis-
tribution. 
I have been appalled by the news 
reports showing the Kurds brutaliz-
ing and killing each other to get at 
the supplies being sent to the area. It 
is quite obvious that these people do 
not care about each other but only 
their own personal well-being. No at-
tempt is being made by the Kurds to 
organize distribution of the aid in a 
fair and efficient fashion. 
The Kurds chose to flee their 
homes and go into the wilderness to 
freeze and starve instead of staying 
and fighting Saddam. Either choice 
would mean death and destruction 2 S, ~ 3 
but one choice would have b e e ; g ? K ^ H 
based on honor and bravery, the o3- w cr 5* 
<T clearly is not. . S ^ j » a 
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rintea on political leuers 
1 . . may be withheld for good 
reason on others. Writers are 
limited to one letter of 300 
words or less every 14 days. 
Preference will be given to type-
written (double spaced) letters 
permitting use of the writer's 
true name. All letters are sub-
ject to condensation. Mail to the 
Public Forum, The Salt Lake 
Tribune, P.O. Box 867, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84110. 
Defends Rights 
In response to Jeffrey W. Squires 
(Forum, April 15), I can assure you 
that you can express your conscience 
any time, any place, without any in-
terference from the American Civil 
Liberties Union. Indeed, should any-
one else interfere, the ACLU would 
defend your right to freedom of ex-
pression. 
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Never in any media, 
television, radio and newsprint, ^WM ,_ w p ^ 
I ever seen a more inaccurate di^ 5. ~ cr ^ ~ g 
tion of what was said than the op '< B' 8 g. a g. 
mg sentence of Carol Sisco's and k £> % § ft 8- g-
hnda Sowerby's article [on LD* w ° 
General Conference] in the April ? 
issue of Tfie Tribune. They wroU 
Parents were counseled Saturd, 
to offer up a second son if or 
killed while serving a Mormon mis-
sion." 
They could not have distorted 
Marvin J Ashton's remarks to a 
greater extent than they did in this 
article Did they listen to the same 
talk that thousands of others heard, 
or did they obtain their opening line 
from "a reliable source?'1 Surely 
they did not listen to Elder Ashton's 
talk and come up with such an out-
landish interpretation themselves. 
Ladies . . ladies . . . plead igno-
rance on your grossly misinterpreted 
distortion of what was written and 
apologize to Marvin J. Ashton. More 
importantly, after writing something 
so absolutely inaccurate, you should 
both personally apologize to the fain-
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On a single outing last fall, not even 
during peak user months, my com-
panions and I collected nine, 50-gal-
lon bags of trash before our activity, 
simply to make our chosen site fit for 
human habitation. 
A six-pack of beer, a hamburger 
and fries or a movie cost less than a 
day pass to the canyon. Even if ev-
eryone who uses the canyon toted 
out all the trash (and people don't), 
there would be attrition and damage 
from the mere intrusion of humans 
into the ecosystem. Reforestation, 
sanitation, maintenance of barbecue 
and picnic equipment, ranger ser-
vices are not freebies. Users of the 
canyon should pay for these. 
Learning that we are caretakers, 
is rhpnn at twice the o n n e n m o r c 
Wayne" Owe id Bill Orton have 
their eyes a. mioses on this section 
of wilderness. 
EUGENE J. FAUX M.D. 
Provo 
Seeks Prayer Truce 
I appreciated The Tribune's edito-
rial March 24 on the temporary 
"cease-fire" in the conflict over 
graduation prayers at public schools 
now that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
agreed to hear the case of Lee vs. 
Weisman from Providence, R.L 
I am very pleased that the court 
hai? finally agreed to hear such a 
case. Our public school officials find 
very little authoritative guidance un-
der current decisions as to the consti-
tutional permissibility of prayer at 
commencement exercises. It was for 
that reason that my office, on behalf 
of the Utah State Board of Educa-
tion, filed a "friend of the court" 
brief urging the court to agree to 
hear the case. Now that the court has 
agreed, we will also be filing a brief 
"on the merits," not arguing for 
more or less prayer, but for clear 
and manageable guidelines for our 
school officials to know what to do. 
The high court's decision to hear 
the Rhode Island case now means 
that a resolution of the graduation 
prayer issue is in sight, and argu-
ment is expected for October or No-
vember of this year. In light of this 
development, I certainly do feel that 
further expenditure of tax funds in 
defending additional prayer cases in 
Utah courts is not prudent. Whatev-
er small victories are earned in the 
short term will be mooted when the 
high court rules in the Weisman 
case. 
Of course, the decision to spend 
tax dollars in defense of prayers at 
this spring's commencement cere-
monies in Utah is not mine to make. 
Those decisions will probably be 
made by the school districts in ques-
tion. 
The sub-theme of your editorial, 
that my comments as to the advis-
ability of a short-term neutral stance 
were ulate" was perplexing to me It 
would be most inappropriate for me 
to assume that I should "speak up" 
and pre-empt decisions which are, in 
Utah's system of government, en-
trusted to the legislature, governor, 
school districts or courts. It is not the 
attorney general's responsibility to 
decide whether the districts will al-
low prayers, nor to fight or to fi-
nance the inevitable lawsuits which 
are filed in response to such prayers 
If you mean, by your suggestion of 
lateness, that I shoula have rendered 
legal opinion on the subject, that also 
misses the mark. This office gives le-
gal opinions only in circumstances 
defined by state statute, of which 
none have ever been presented to us. 
My comment urging a temporary 
truce was prompted solely by the 
dramatic news from the high court. 
Why not put a short-term hold on the 
emotional and economic hemor-
rhage and wait for the only answer 
